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Comments
PREMATURITY AND PRESCRIPTION UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT WHERE
THE EMPLOYEE IS RETAINED ON THE
PAYROLL AFTER INJURY
Employer's
Liability Act provides compensation for
Louisiana's
employees who are disabled due to injuries arising out of and dur[397]
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ing the course of the employer's hazardous business.' The courts
have held that an employee is totally and permanently disabled if
he is no longer capable of performing the duties of the occupation
in which he was engaged at the time of the injury. It is clear that
he is entitled to compensation for his injury even though he should
find work of a different nature with another employer2 and at a
higher wage.' This has led to several difficulties in cases where the
employee remains with the same employer performing different
duties and receiving wages equal to or greater than the maximum
allowable compensation. Thus the extent of the rights of the injured
employee may depend not only on the injury itself, but also upon
the identity of the subsequent employer. Among the problems raised
by this type of situation are those of prematurity and prescription.
Under the act as originally drafted, the injured employee was
entitled not only to have the amount of his compensation determined but also to have a judgment fixing the period of disability,
notwithstanding that when the suit was brought the employer was
paying the maximum compensation This position may be justified
by Section 17 of the act, which enumerates the disputes that may be
compromised and includes the "extent or duration of the injury or
disability involved."
Later legislation, however, has reflected the attitude that employers who are paying full compensation should not be harassed
with law suits by their injured employees. The legislature in 1926
enacted Section 18.1 (B) which provides, "Unless ...it is alleged
...that the employee or the dependent is not being or has not been
paid, and that the employer has refused to pay, the maximum per
centum of wages to which petitioner is entitled under the provisions
of this act, the presentation or filing of such complaints shall be
premature and shall be dismissed . ..."'
Relying upon the 1926 amendment, the court of appeal for the
first circuit held that, despite the fact that a dispute exists as to the
total amount of the claim, any action brought while the employee
1. La. Act 20 of 1914, as last amended by La. Acts 120 and 143 of 1944
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-4432].
2. McQueen v. Union Indemnity Co., 18 La. App. 612, 136 So. 761 (1931);
Brown v. Continental Oil Co., 22 So. (2d) 758 (La. App. 1945); McKenzie v.
Standard Motor Co., 15 So. (2d) 115 (La. App. 1943).
3. Sumrall v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 1 So. (2d) 430 (La. App
1941).
4. Ford v. Fortuna Oil Co., 151 La. 489, 91 So. 849 (1922); Daniels v.
Shreveport Producing & Refining Corp., 151 La. 800, 92 So. 341 (1922); Hulo v.
City of New Iberia, 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1923).
5. La. Act 85 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4408(1)(B)].
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is actually receiving the maximum allowable compensation is premature.' In Ulmer v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company' the
same court was faced with a situation where the employee was
placed on light duty and continued on the payroll at the same wages
after the injury. The plaintiff asked for compensation for the period
during which wages were received. Holding the suit premature, the
court relied upon the well known case, Rylander v. T. Smith & Son,
Incorporated,' where the supreme court had stated that:
"The workmen's compensation statute is not a statute
allowing the workman damages for injuries sustained in the
course of his employment even through the negligence or fault
of his employer. It is essentially insurance against the loss or
diminution of earning capacity, ...
It is noteworthy that the Rylander case involved an entirely different problem. The question there was as to the manner of determining the amount of compensation to be allowed where the employee
had worked only part time. The court concluded that workmen's
compensation was essentially insurance against loss of earning
capacity and that payments should be determined by the agreed
rate of wages instead of the average amount actually received.
The supreme court in Carlino v. United States Fidelity Company' approved the holding of the Ulmer case, but stated:
"... that a suit brought by an injured employee for compensation for a period during which he is paid wages equal to or
exceeding in amount the compensation claimed would be unavailing, not on the ground of its being premature, but because
there would be no cause or right of action for compensation for
that period."
The Carlino case also involved the question whether or not an
employee could maintain a suit for compensation while being paid
wages equal to or greater than the maximum allowable compensation under the act. The court, relying primarily on Hulo v. City of
6. Moss v. Levin, 10 La. App. 149, 119 So. 558 (1929); Reiner v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 185 So. 93 (La. App. 1938); Pitts v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 186 So.
389 (La. App. 1939).
7. 190 So. 175 (La. App. 1939).
8. 177 La. 716, 720, 149 So. 434, 435 (1933).
9. 196 La. 400, 415, 199 So. 228, 233 (1940).
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New Iberia"° and without mentioning Section 18.1(B) of the act,
states:
"... that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment fixing the rate
of compensation to which he is entitled, even though the insurer
should not be obliged to pay the compensation as long as the
employer continues to pay to the injured employee-even as a
gratuity-wages equal to or exceeding in amount the compensation which he is entitled to.""
The following year the court of appeal for the first circuit, in
Carpenter v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, 2 held that
where the injured employee was assigned to lighter duties at his old
salary, prescription was interrupted under Section 31 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In Arnold v. Solvay Process Company," a
suit was based on a specific injury under Section 8(1) (d). This same
court held that payments of wages after injury did not interrupt
prescription under Section 31. In differentiating the Carpentercase
the court explained that the reason for its holding there was that
the employee had been led into a false sense of security. A sounder
basis for distinction and one easier to administer is that the Carpenter case was based primarily on loss of earning capacity and brought
under Section 8(1) (b), while the Arnold case was an action under
Section 8(1) (d) for a specific injury, and loss of earning capacity
is not a factor in such a suit.
This problem reached its climax in Thornton v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Company. 4 Here the plaintiff, not being able to perform his regular duties after an injury, was given light work and
retained at the same salary. Eleven months and thirty days after his
injury he instituted an action for permanent total disability. The
supreme court held that plaintiff had acted advisedly in bringing his
action before the year expired, since payments of wages do not in10. 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1923). This case was decided before Section
18.1(B) was added to the act.
11. 196 La. 400, 411, 199 So. 228, 282 (1940).
12. 194 So. 99, 101 (La. App. 1940), the court stated, "The statute itself
as is well known calls for a liberal interpretation of its provisions in favor of
the injured employee, and it is our confirmed opinion that when, with knowledge
of the employee's disabling injury, the employer continues to pay him usual
wages which is 35 per cent. more than the amount of compensation he would
have to pay for performing lighter services than he was doing before, there
results a situation in which the provisions of the statute regarding the bar of
peremption have been fully satisfied and, as long as those payments continue
prescription does not run."

13. 15 So. (2d)

238 (La. App. 1943).

14. 207 La. 239, 21 So. (2d)

46 (1944).
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terrupt the running of prescription. It explained that Section
18.1(B), which provides that a suit will be premature unless it is
alleged the employer has refused to pay the maximum per cent of
wages to which the employee is entitled under the provisions of the
act, has reference only to payments of, compensation. It has no application where the payment is made in the form of wages. Justice
Rogers dissented on the ground that Section 18.1(B) does make an
action premature where wages equal to or greater than the allowable compensation are being paid. The dissent reasoned .that this
position would work no hardship upon the injured employee because, under a liberal interpretation of Section 31, such payments
would interrupt prescription.
It appears that the application of Section 18.1 (B) will be strictly
limited to payments of compensation. Where the plaintiff alleges
that he is receiving maximum compensation, but the employer has
refused to admit the extent of his liability, a suit to fix the period
is premature.' 5 However, if the plaintiff is receiving earned wages,
a suit for compensation may be brought.' 6 The supreme court has
recently indicated that should the wages be unearned, such payments
will be treated as compensation 7 and the suit be held premature.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Thornton case
seem to agree that prematurity and prescription are interrelated. If
the plaintiff cannot proceed because his action is premature, prescription obviously should not run; whereas prescription does run
when the action would not be premature. This result appears to be
in agreement with the general idea of prescription, that the plaintiff
should not be prejudiced if he is doing all he can to preserve his
rights.
15. Lanoue v. Century Indemnity Co., 30 So. (2d) 207 (La. App. 1947).'
16. Thornton v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 207 La. 239, 21 So. (2d)
46 (1944); Rigsby v. John W. Clark 'Lumber Co., 28 So. (2d) 346 (La.
App. 1946).
17. See Dominic A. D'Antoni v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd.,
La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 88,443 (1948). Plaintiff was injured while employed
as a motorcycle policeman. After partial recovery he was assigned, at his usual
wage, to a clerical position and later to another light job, that of making patrols
in automobiles driven by other men. While employed in the latter capacity he
brought this suit, claiming the' maximum compensation allowed for permanent
and total disability. The supreme court overruled the plea of prematurity and
stated:
"If the employee is actually earning the wages paid him, his suit
cannot be dismissed on a plea of prematurity for as much as he is not
receiving compensation. . . . Conversely, if it is shown on the trial of
the plea that the wages being paid the employee are in reality a gratuity
and not for the performance of work, then the action will be dismissed
as premature-for, in such instance, the payment of the wage is the
equivalent to the payment of compensation."
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According to the majority opinion, where wages are being paid
to the disabled employee, he is entitled to have his rights fixed by a
judgment and should not be made to rely on the uncertainty that
the employer will continue such payments. However, the uncertainty
here is no greater than in the case where the employer is making
compensation payments and will not admit his total liability. Yet it
is agreed that an action for compensation, while maximum payments are being made, is premature under Section 18.1(B).
The minority opinion in the Thornton case reaches the seemingly anomalous result that if the plaintiff is employed elsewhere at
a different occupation he may maintain his action for compensation, even though the wage he is receiving is greater than payments
of compensation; while if he remains with the same employer performing different duties, such action is premature. This is the unavoidable result of a basic incongruity of doctrine. The courts have
persistently defined "disability" to mean incapacity to perform the
duties engaged in at the time of the injury. However, they have also
insisted that the primary purpose of the Workmen's Compensation
Act is insurance against loss of earning capacity. These two notions
must necessarily rub elbows at some point.
As a practical matter, the advantages realized seem to overshadow the theoretical inconsistencies. The dissenting opinion seems
more in accord with the policy upon which the act is based. If an
employer is willing to rehabilitate his injured employees by retaining
them on the payroll at lighter duties, this practice should be encouraged, for it produces a result similar to the object at which the Workmen's Compensation Act is aimed. It creates good relations between
management and labor, and probably furnishes a more substantive
source of income than the act can provide. The employee is thus
encouraged to render valuable services, and avoid the complete loss
of manpower which so often follows the resort to compensation.
In order to protect fully the rights of the injured employee
under such a plan, the courts would have to adopt a liberal interpretation of Section 31 of the act and hold that such payments would
stop the running of prescription, thereby recognizing the interrelationship of prematurity and prescription.
IDDO PITTMAN, JR.

